We consider a frictional market where an element of the terms of trade (price or quantity) is posted ex-ante (before the matching process) while the other is determined ex-post. By doing so, sellers can exploit their local monopoly power by adjusting prices or quantities once the local demand is realized. We find that when sellers can adjust quantities ex-post, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium where an increase in the buyer-seller ratio leads to higher quantities and prices. When buyers instead can choose quantities ex-post, a higher buyerseller ratio leads to higher prices but lower traded quantities. These equilibrium allocations are generically constrained inefficient in both intensive and extensive margins. When sellers post ex-ante quantities and adjust prices ex-post, a symmetric equilibrium exists where buyers obtain no surplus from trade. This equilibrium allocation is not constrained efficient either. If buyers choose prices ex-post, there is no trade in equilibrium when entry is costly.
Introduction
Search and matching models have been developed and extensively applied in labor economics. In these settings, search is typically assumed to be two-sided so that firms search for workers and the unemployed search for jobs.
1 This kind of search framework has also been applied to goods/services markets as well as to monetary economics.
2 Regardless of the market at hand, the typical assumption in these environments is that the terms of trade are determined ex-post (after the match has taken place) via a bargaining procedure (generalized Nash or Kalai). Recently, however, a large and growing literature, both in labor and monetary economics, allows one side of the market to post and commit ex-ante to a wage (price) or more general terms of trade. The competitive search framework captures such departures. 3 The key assumptions in such environments are that: (i) one side of the market is able to fully commit ex-ante to all posted terms of trade, (ii) the other side of the market is able to observe all posted terms of trade, (iii) a single agent posting the terms of trade is not capable of serving the entire market, and (iv) typically goods are indivisible. 4 This paper adds to the literature by allowing part of the terms of trade to be determined ex-post in a competitive search environment. So far in the competitive search literature, the only possibility for sellers to exploit ex-post opportunities has been to post auctions, which requires multilateral meetings. 5 Here we explore an alternative procedure to allow sellers or buyers to exploit ex-post opportunities. To do so, we consider a competitive search framework where sellers produce any quantity at a convex cost while serving only one buyer at a time. In contrast to the previous literature, sellers have the ability to commit ex-ante to either prices or quantities, while choosing the other terms ex-post. We also consider the possibility of buyers choosing a part of the terms of trade ex-post. Sellers' or buyers' ability to choose one component of the terms of trade, after the matching process has taken place, is what we refer to as ex-post opportunism. Many markets have this feature. This is especially relevant if one considers the quality margin interpretation of the model. Such arrangements are found in part-time jobs, where wage rates are posted but hours worked are determined ex-post. Ex-post opportunism can also be observed in other markets. For instance, apartments or houses sold before construction or new cars priced and ordered/sold before they are manufactured. 6 When sellers choose quantities ex-post, we show that marginal cost pricing is the unique symmetric equilibrium as in the standard perfectly competitive market. However, this equilibrium can lead to under, over, or efficient production. These different possibilities critically depend on the aggregate buyer-seller ratio or market tightness. For small entry costs, there is excessive entry and under-production relative to the efficient quantity (vice versa for large entry costs). This is in sharp contrast to the standard competitive search equilibrium, where
Relevant Literature
This paper relates to two different strands of literature. One explores how various trading mechanisms, that are posted ex-ante, affect the resulting equilibrium price and quantity. The other strand of literature studies the equilibrium properties once we relax the assumption of ex-ante commitment of all terms of trade.
The paper that is mostly related to ours is Peters (1984) . This author considers a large directed search market where sellers face a convex cost, an exogenous production capacity, , and post per unit prices. Upon a match, buyers choose the quantity, . Thus sellers produce the minimum of and . In equilibrium, sellers post a price equal to average cost. In contrast to Peters (1984) , here we allow either buyers or sellers to make the quantity choice ex-post. As a result, the equilibrium features marginal cost pricing when sellers determine quantities ex-post, and marginal utility pricing when buyers propose quantities ex-post. This is in contrast to Peters (1984) who always finds average cost pricing. Although we do not consider an exogenous capacity constraint, at the end of Section 2.4 we discuss what would happen if it is imposed and buyers choose quantities ex-post. In such an environment, we find that, if the capacity constraint is severe, the equilibrium is consistent with average cost pricing. In addition, depending on the buyer-seller ratio, we find that over, under, or efficient production is possible. This paper also complements the work of Faig and Jerez (2005) . These authors consider a competitive search framework where sellers compete by offering a nonlinear pricing schedule ( ). Buyers have private information and, upon meeting a seller, they choose the quantity and pay ( ). The authors show that when sellers offer two-tier prices, even with private information about buyers' values, the competitive search equilibrium is constrained efficient. More recently Geromichalos (2012 Geromichalos ( , 2014 , Godenhielm and Kultti (2015) also allow sellers to post and commit ex-ante to multiple indivisible goods. These are produced at a convex cost. Similarly, within the labor market, Hawkins (2013) and Lester (2010) allow firms to post multiple indivisible vacancies at a convex cost. These papers assume that all the terms of trade are posted and committed ex-ante, i.e., before a match takes place. Godenhielm and Kultti (2014) consider an environment where sellers choose the quantity to be produced first, and then prices. When selecting sellers, the authors consider two cases, one where buyers can observe the quantities and one in which they cannot. The authors find that the equilibrium price is similar to Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) , and hence, not tied to marginal or average cost. In contrast to Godenhielm and Kultti (2014) , here we consider production on demand.
The other literature that this paper relates to is the one that relaxes the assumption of ex-ante commitment in all terms of trade. Rather than allowing for auctions, papers in this literature allow for some form of renegotiation. For instance, Doyle and Wong (2013) study a directed search labor market where firms post wages but allow for ex-post wage renegotiation. The authors impose "downward commitment" so that firms can only commit to paying no less than their posted wage. In their environment, only a lump-sum wage is posted and hours are not divisible. Thus no intensive margin of adjustment is possible. Along the same lines, Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2016) consider the housing market and assume that sellers of an indivisible house cannot commit to their advertised ex-ante price. Once matched, home owners can accept prices above or below their posted price. After an inspection buyers learn their idiosyncratic valuation for the house. Then each buyer can accept the asking price, submit a counter-offer, or walk away. When buyers submit counter-offers, without imposing "downward commitment", they do so without knowing how many other bidders have visited the house. As in Doyle and Wong (2013) , there is no intensive margin that can be adjusted. 9 In contrast to these papers, here we focus on equilibria where some elements of the terms of trade (price or quantity) are not committed before matches take place. Thus, we allow for both intensive and extensive margins of adjustment.
The Model
Following Moen (1997) , Montgomery (1991) , and Shimer (1996.), we consider a competitive search framework with a continuum of uncoordinated buyers and potential sellers, with measures and̄, respectively. Sellers need to cover a fixed cost, > 0, to participate in the market. The aggregate active market tightness is given by Θ = / , where the measure of active sellers, , is endogenously determined by free entry. Buyers have preferences (⋅) over goods produced by sellers who incur a cost (⋅). The primitives of the economy (⋅) and (⋅) satisfy usual properties of monotonicity, strict concavity and convexity. In addition, we assume that (0) = (0) = 0, (̂) = (̂) for somê> 0, and ′′′ and ′′′ exist. 10 Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume full information so that all actions are observed by everyone.
Any positive measure of sellers posting the same terms of trade, = ( , ) ∈ × ⊆ ℝ 2 + , form a submarket. From now on we adopt the following notation so that denotes the per unit price, is the quantity or quality of the good, and is the corresponding buyer-seller ratio in that submarket. Buyers have access to a large number of these submarkets and choose which market to enter. Within each submarket, buyers and sellers meet according to a matching technology that is homogeneous of degree one. Sellers' (buyers') meeting rate is ( )( ( )/ ), with
, and lim →∞ ′ ( ) = 0. In addition, we assume that the sellers' elasticity of the matching rate, ( ) = ′ ( ) / ( ), is decreasing with respect to the market tightness so that ′ ( ) < 0. 11 After agents are matched, sellers obtain surplus, which we denote by ( , ) = − ( ), while buyers get their corresponding surplus, which we represent by ( , ) = ( ) − .
Within this frictional environment, we first consider the efficient allocation chosen by a social planner. We then compare different decentralized allocations against the planner's solution. As a benchmark, we first analyze a situation where sellers post and commit ex-ante to both per unit prices and quantities. Then, we explore situations where sellers do not have as much ex-ante commitment. In particular, we consider the case where sellers post ex-ante prices and the quantity is determined ex-post, i.e. after matches have taken place. Finally, we characterize the equilibrium where sellers post ex-ante quantities and prices are determined ex-post.
Planner's Problem
A benevolent social planner maximizes the net expected total surplus by choosing a quantity to be traded, , and a measure of active sellers, . The planner, however, is constrained by the matching technology that agents face. In particular, if the meeting technology in any submarket allows for multilateral meetings, after sellers and buyers meet, the planner randomly selects a buyer to be allocated to a seller. If the meeting technology is pairwise, matching occurs between just one seller and one buyer. Because of this matching restriction, we refer to the planner's solution as the "constrained efficient" allocation.
The planner solves the following problem
which we can rewrite as follows
Given the properties of the matching technology, utility and cost functions, the planner's optimal allocation satisfies the following conditions
where
is the elasticity of the seller's matching rate and ( , Θ ) is the constrained efficient allocation in terms of the quantity traded and the market tightness, respectively.
Ex-ante Price and Quantity Posting By Sellers
In this section, the posted terms of trade are akin to the competitive search section of Rocheteau and Wright (2005) , where goods are divisible and all terms of trade are posted ex-ante. Given this trading protocol, we construct a competitive search equilibrium by analyzing an optimal deviation of a submarket. All sellers in the deviating submarket post terms of trade , while the rest of sellers in other submarkets post . In equilibrium, buyers and sellers are indifferent across submarkets. Moreover, we have that = Θ and = . This allows us to focus on just one submarket.
In submarket , every seller posting the same the terms of trade, ( , ), with implied market tightness, , solves the following problem:
wherē= max ( , )∈ℝ 2 + ( , , Θ) > 0 is the buyer's maximum expected market utility that he can obtain when participating in any other submarket. 13 Notice that constraint eq. (2) implies > 0 in submarket , while = 0 if ( , ) ( )/ <̄. As in standard competitive search models, in any optimal deviation the participation constraint for buyers is always binding.
From constraint eq. (2), we can obtain ( ;̄), which represents buyers' beliefs about the market tightness in the deviating submarket . Note that these beliefs are pinned down by the market utilitȳ. Technically, one can substitute ( ;̄) in the seller's objective function and proceed with the maximization. Alternatively, an easier procedure is to directly choose .
14 Using this latter approach, we can reduce the seller's maximization problem to
Solving the constraint for and substituting into ( , ), it is easy to show that optimality implies an efficient equilibrium quantity * = and a per unit price given by
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have * = and = Θ. As a result, we obtain the following equilibrium price
which is a convex combination of the average utility and the average cost evaluated at * . Notice that if we rewrite the above pricing equation as follows
we recover the standard Hosios sharing rule. This rule always holds endogenously in any standard competitive search model when all the terms of trade are committed ex-ante.
This competitive search equilibrium is always surplus maximizing, but, depending on Θ, it could be that
Notice that the equilibrium quantity does not depend on Θ. A sudden inflow of buyers leading to a larger Θ would result in a higher price and no change in quantity traded. This is the case as ′ (Θ) < 0 . Under free entry, the equilibrium market tightness Θ * is given by
Substituting eq. (3), the previous condition then becomes
As we can see, under ex-ante commitment to all the terms of trade, the resulting equilibrium allocation is constrained efficient.
Ex-ante Price Posting and Ex-post Quantity by Sellers
Next, we consider the situation where prices are posted ex-ante and sellers optimally choose quantities ex-post, i.e., after the matches have taken place. Having observed all ex-ante prices, buyers decide which submarket to participate in. To construct this equilibrium, we need to not only account for the optimal deviation in price, but also the deviating sellers' optimal ex-post reaction to their quantity choice.
Since the trading mechanism now has two stages, we solve for equilibrium backwards. We first solve for the sellers' optimal choice of given . Then we solve for the competitive search equilibrium choice of . First, we analyze the case with no entry costs, and subsequently allow for free entry.
Consider the ex-post problem where deviating sellers take the posted price as given. Upon meeting a buyer, a seller solves the following problem
When the constraint is not binding, the optimal quantitỹsatisfies the following conditions
If it is binding, the optimal quantity is given by
Both of these optimal conditions yield a bijection between prices and quantities, which from now on we denote bỹ( ).
Lemma 1
In any competitive search equilibrium, given the posted price , the seller's optimal ex-post quantity choice satisfies = ′ (̃).
Taking the ex-post optimal choicẽas given, we now solve for the competitive search equilibrium price. While other submarkets post the same and Θ, the positive measure of deviating sellers solve the following problem
It is easy to show that the optimal solution satisfies
In a symmetric equilibrium, = and = Θ, which implies (Θ). Compared to the previous equilibrium where sellers commit ex-ante to all terms of trade, showing existence and uniqueness is slightly more involved. Fortunately, we can rewrite the seller's problem by substituting in = ′ (̃) and maximize as if sellers were choosing̃ex-ante. 15 To simplify notation, let̃= from now on. The problem for sellers then become
whose optimal solution (Θ) satisfies the following
Interestingly, the previous condition can be rewritten as
where ( ) = ′ ( )/ ( ) and ( ) = − ′ ( )/ ( ) are the seller's and buyer's surplus elasticities with respect to output, respectively. This expression is a Hosios-like sharing rule expressed in surplus elasticities.
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It is important to highlight that the seller's optimal ex-post choice of depends on the relative surpluses of buyers and sellers as well as the seller's contribution to the matching rate.
Proposition 1
For all As we can see, when sellers post prices ex-ante and quantities ex-post, the equilibrium is such that it always yields marginal cost pricing as long as ′′′ / ′′ < ( ) − 1. Such cost requirement simply reflects that the elasticity of the seller's surplus with respect to needs to be large enough. 17 The results of Proposition 1 are depicted in Figure 1 . Comparing the equilibrium allocation to the one obtained by the planner, we note that for a particular value of market tightness Θ , such that (Θ ) = and
we have that outcomes for the planner's problem and the sellers' ex-ante pricing with ex-post opportunism in quantities are equivalent. However, this result is of measure zero as it only holds for one market tightness, Θ = Θ . Under free entry, the allocation is constrained efficient at the extensive margin if and only if eq. (9) holds and the following condition is satisfied
Otherwise, entry is inefficient. Another way to view this knife-edge result is that given the unique efficient quantity, , there exists a unique entry cost that can generate Θ . These results are in sharp contrast to the standard competitive search equilibrium in Sub section 2.2, where the constrained efficient quantity, , and entry, Θ , are always achieved. With ex-post quantity trading, efficiency is achieved only if Θ happens to be such that ′ ( (Θ)) = (Θ) = ′ ( (Θ)). As we can see, the ability to commit ex-ante to all terms of trade is critical in obtaining the constrained efficient outcome.
Proposition 2
Given an entry cost, > 0, there exists a unique equilibrium price and quantity that is generically not constrained efficient at the intensive nor the extensive margin.
Exploring this "partial commitment" of posting ex-ante prices and determining quantities ex-post is interesting and relevant as it has many applications. These range from new real estate construction to labor market. In the context of the labor market, assume that a measure of vacancies are matched with a measure of unemployed so that Θ = / (thus firms are buyers and workers are sellers). The surplus from a match is (ℎ), where ℎ represents hours worked by workers. Let (ℎ) be the cost for workers when working ℎ and ℎ be the wage bill paid by the firm. If workers (sellers) compete by posting ( , ) to attract firms and then they choose ℎ ex-post, this problem is equivalent to the one previously described in this section. 18 In particular, note that if ≡ ℎ, ( ) ≡ (ℎ), (ℎ) ≡ ( ), and ℎ ≡ , all the previous results follow. In this labor market setting, workers would set wages ex-ante and choose hours ex-post, such that = ′ (ℎ). Only a particular value of Θ would result in ′ (ℎ(Θ)) = (Θ) = ′ (ℎ(Θ)), so that workers are paid at their marginal product. Otherwise, for other values of Θ, workers could be paid above or below their marginal product. A sudden increase in Θ would lead to an increase in both wage and hours worked. Compared to workers posting ( , ℎ, ), hours in equilibrium would always be determined by efficient hours ′ (ℎ ) = ′ (ℎ ), which are independent of Θ, with wages increasing in Θ.
Ex-ante Price Posting by Sellers and Ex-post Quantity by Buyers
In this section we consider the possibility that buyers, instead of sellers, choose quantities ex-post.
19 Given and after the match has taken place, buyers solve the following problem
When the constraint is not binding, the optimal quantitỹsatisfies
When it is binding, the optimal quantity is given by = (̃) and ′ (̃) < .
These equations yield a bijection between and , which we denote bỹ( ) with̃′( ) < 0.
Lemma 2
In any competitive search equilibrium, given the posted price , the optimal ex-post choice of quantity by buyers is given by = ′ (̃).
This result is analogous to Lemma 1 where sellers are choosing ex-post. However, the difference is that rather than marginal cost pricing, we now have marginal utility pricing and̃′( ) < 0 rather than being positive.
Proposition 3
For all Θ ∈ (0, ∞), if ′′′ / ′′ < ( ) − 1, where ( ) = ′ ( ) / ( ) > 1, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium with all sellers choosing (Θ) ex-ante and buyers choosing (Θ) ex-post, such that (Θ) = ′ ( (Θ)), where (Θ) ∈ ( ,̄), ′ ( ) = 0 and (̄) = 0. In addition, (Θ) is strictly increasing in Θ while (Θ) is strictly decreasing in Θ.
As we can see, when sellers post prices ex-ante and buyers choose quantities ex-post, the equilibrium yields marginal utility pricing as long as the utility function is such that ′′′ / ′′ < ( ) − 1. To understand the sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium, note that if ( ) is strictly convex, then it implies that ( ) > 1. However, the surplus needs to be convex enough relative to the concavity of the utility function.
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The previous restrictions are consistent with a wide range of utility functions, including ′′′ ≥ 0 and ′′′ < 0. The results of Proposition 3 are shown in Figure 2 . Comparing this equilibrium allocation to that of the planner, we note that for a particular value of Θ, say Θ , such that (Θ ) = and
the planner's solution and the partial commitment outcomes are equivalent. However, this is only true for a very specific value of Θ . When sellers face entry costs, the allocation is constrained efficient at the extensive margin if and only if eq. (10) holds and we have that
Otherwise, entry is inefficient. In other words, given the unique efficient quantity, , there is a unique entry cost that can generate the efficient market tightness Θ . These results echo the ones with marginal cost pricing found in the previous section.
Proposition 4
Given an entry cost > 0, there exists a unique equilibrium that is generically constrained inefficient both at the intensive and extensive margins.
Since the environment we have considered is related to the one analyzed in Peters (1984) , we offer a more detailed comparison. In particular, Peters (1984) considers an environment with price competition among firms when they face capacity constraints and buyers have limited ability to visit firms. 21 Each firm selects a price and a rationing rule that specifies how the firm will allocate output if its capacity constraint is binding. Knowing the price and rationing rule, consumers choose a shopping strategy. Peters (1984) , in Proposition 3, establishes that as the number of sellers goes to infinity (while keeping the number of buyers finite) the gain for sellers to deviate from average cost pricing is less than . Therefore, he finds that = ( )/ . Note that sending the number of sellers to infinity while keeping buyers finite drives the market tightness to zero. This situation emulates a perfectly competitive market. Then, it should be no surprise that the equilibrium pricing gives zero profit to sellers. Moreover, Peters (1984) assumes an exogenous capacity such that ′ ( ) = ∞ , for all ≥ . The ex-post demand by a buyer is = min{ ( ), }.
22 Peters (1984) acknowledges that for large markets (the number of buyers and sellers tend to infinity while keeping a constant market tightness) the equilibrium properties may change. 23 To check this claim, let us consider a similar capacity constraint in our model. The optimal choice for buyers is then = min{ ′−1 ( ), }. Note that in the previous analysis leading to Proposition 1, we assume that the capacity constraint ≤ is not binding, and buyers choose ex-post quantity such that = ′ ( ). In contrast to Peters (1984) , we argue that this ex-post marginal utility pricing is indeed an equilibrium if the capacity constraint is not severe. Otherwise, the average cost pricing in Peters (1984) holds. Thus, if min{ ′−1 ( ), } = , we have that ′ ( ) > . As a result, the optimal buyer's ex-post choice is to consume = and hence = ( )/ . For severe capacity constraints, Peters' ( 1984) result holds even for large markets.
Ex-ante Quantity Posting and Ex-post Pricing by Sellers
In this section, we assume that sellers can post a quantity ex-ante and then choose a price ex-post. Working backwards, sellers take as given ex-ante posted quantities and solve the following problem
Sellers extract all the surplus in a match by setting prices such that * = ( )/ ≡ ( ). Note that under this trading protocol, the seller's pricing decision does not directly depend on . Differentiating this ex-post pricing rule, it is easy to show that * = ′ ( ) − * .
As in the previous sections, we can rewrite the competitive search problem using the bijection = ( ). Ex-ante sellers posting = ( , ) ∈ ℝ 2 + , then solve the following problem
which yields the following solution
Note that eqs. (11) and (13) imply an efficient quantity. When sellers post quantities ex-ante and choose prices ex-post, they choose to post the efficient quantity to attract buyers, and then extract all the surplus from trade by adjusting prices ex-post. This allocation and pricing strategy is akin to Diamond's ( 1971) equilibrium. Since buyers are rational, they fully anticipate that the seller's best ex-post choice is to fully extract all of their surplus, which implies̄= 0. Thus buyers are indifferent between participating or not. Note that this equilibrium would occur for even a non-zero outside option for buyers, .
24 Then, the equilibrium would entail̄= . If sellers were given the choice of what component of the terms of trade to post ex-ante, no sellers would want to deviate from posting only ex-ante. The seller's entry condition is given by
Compared to the planner's solution, given by eq. (1), we have that Θ * < Θ . Thus we observe excessive entry. This is a direct consequence of having sellers extract all the surplus of the match.
Proposition 5
When sellers post quantities ex-ante and prices ex-post, a symmetric equilibrium exists where buyers get zero surplus and the constrained efficient allocation is implemented at the intensive margin, however, entry is excessive.
Although this case is interesting, examples of such mechanisms are harder to find. One such case would be markets where items are advertised with undisclosed prices and buyers are asked to request a quote after contacting the seller.
Ex-ante Quantity Posting by Sellers and Ex-post Pricing by Buyers
Finally, just for completeness, we consider an environment where sellers post quantities ex-ante and buyers choose prices ex-post. Working backwards, buyers take as given posted quantities and solve the following problem
Buyers are able to extract all the surplus by offering prices such that * = ( )/ ≡ ℎ( ). Note that the buyer's pricing decision does not directly depend on . Differentiating this ex-post buyer's pricing rule, it is straightforward to show that *
Similarly, we can transform the competitive search problem using the bijection = ℎ( ), with ex-ante sellers posting = ( , ) ∈ ℝ 2 + , and solving
The solution is given by
Note that combining eqs. (14) and (15), we have that the resulting equilibrium quantity is efficient. When sellers post quantities ex-ante and buyers choose prices ex-post, sellers choose to post the efficient quantity to attract buyers, knowing that buyers will then extract all the surplus from trade by adjusting prices ex-post. If there is an entry cost > 0, no sellers would be active in the market since (ℎ( ), ) = 0 < . There is no equilibrium with an active market. Because is a sunk cost, sellers are being held up whenever buyers can choose the price ex-post. This may explain why such a mechanism is rarely observed in markets.
Conclusion
We consider a frictional market where buyers are uncoordinated and sellers cannot commit ex-ante to both per unit prices and quantities. We find that when sellers post prices ex-ante and also choose quantities ex-post, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium with marginal cost pricing. When buyers determine quantities ex-post, the equilibrium features marginal utility pricing instead. Regardless of who is choosing quantities ex-post, the equilibrium is generically constrained inefficient at the intensive and extensive margins. The direction of the intensive margin inefficiency depends on whether sellers or buyers make the ex-post choice.
When sellers choose prices ex-post, they extract all of the buyers' surplus as in the Diamond (1971) equilibrium. The efficient quantity is always produced, but there is excessive entry. In contrast, when buyers determine prices ex-post, this trading mechanism generates a severe holdup problem. When sellers face a positive entry cost, there is no equilibrium with active trade. As in Kim and Kircher (2015) , the choice of the trading mechanism is crucial in determining whether the equilibrium is constrained efficient or not.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Definēsuch that (̄) =̄′(̄), i.e., (̄) = 0, and̄= ′ (̄). We summarize the seller's optimal ex-post choice as follows:
It is important to highlight that both of these solutions imply a monotone relationship between quantity and price. Notice the following
In a competitive search equilibrium with Θ ∈ (0, ∞) , the positive measure of deviating sellers can choose a price that is either in (0,] and the constraint is not binding, or in (, ∞) under a binding constraint. Define the first possible deviation as 1 = ′ (̃1) and the second possible deviation as 2 = (̃2) /̃2. It is easy to show that the sellers' expected payoffs are
while for buyers we have
It is clear that( 2 ) = 0 holds when the buyer's surplus is fully extracted. Thus no buyers would participate in a deviating submarket that offers 2 and̃2. Buyers fully anticipate that the sellers' best ex-post choice is to fully extract all of their surplus. As a result, it must be the case that the competitive search equilibrium price is ∈ (0,]. The optimal ex-post choice is then 1 = ′ (̃1) ∈ (0,]. In other words, buyers anticipate that̃1( 1 ) is the equilibrium sellers' response.
B Proof of Proposition 1
To show existence, first, rewrite eq. (8) as
This condition characterizes (Θ). According to Lemma 1, = ′ ( ). Since ( ) = ( ) − ′ ( ) , we find (0) = 0 = (0). Then, ∃!̄> 0 such that (̄) = 0. In addition, ∃! ∈ (0,̄) such that ′ ( ) = 0. For ∈ ( ,̄),
Thus, under these sufficient conditions, we have that ( ) is downward concave. Similarly, we find that for
Hence, under these sufficient conditions we have that ( ) is upward convex. We also have that ( ) = 1 and (̄) = 0, with ( ) > 0, ∀ ∈ [ ,̄). Since we focus on matching technologies with constant returns to scale, it follows that (Θ) ∈ (0, 1), ∀Θ ∈ (0, ∞). Therefore, given (Θ), ∃ (Θ) ∈ ( ,̄) such that eq. (16) holds and a symmetric equilibrium exists.
To prove uniqueness, we show sufficient conditions for ′ ( ) < 0, ∀ ∈ ( ,̄). Using eq. (16), we have the following (omitting as an argument)
Thus we have that, ∀ ∈ ( ,̄),
not too negative by assumption. For ( ) to be monotonically decreasing in over ( ,̄) , we need to satisfy ′2 − ′′ > 0. This condition holds if
where ( ) = ′ ( ) / ( ) > 1, due to the convexity of ( ). Hence, we also need ′′′ ( ) ≥ 0, not too large. Therefore, as long as ′′′ ( ) ≥ 0 not too positive and ′′′ ( ) < 0 not too negative to preserve the properties of ( ) and ( ), we have ′ ( ) < 0, ∀ ∈ ( ,̄). As a result, there exists a unique equilibrium ∈ ( ,̄), ∀Θ ∈ (0, ∞). Notice that we cannot have an equilibrium with ∈ (0, ). ( 1 ) > 0. Hence, we cannot have ∈ (̄,̂] in any competitive search equilibrium. We are then left to show that for any Θ ∈ (0, ∞), neither nor̄is an equilibrium. Consider the Lagrangian of the competitive search problem:
which yields the following necessary (and sufficient) conditions
These conditions lead to eq. (16) and are valid for any = Θ ∈ (0, ∞). Now transform the second condition as
. Substituting into the first condition, we have that
and (̄) = 0 implies
Therefore, neither nor̄is an equilibrium for = Θ ∈ (0, ∞). Finally, recall that ′ (Θ) < 0 , which holds for a large set of matching technologies. From eq. (16), we have that
Therefore, any increase in Θ leads to higher and over ( ,̄).
C Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that for sellers, the free entry condition is given by
It is easy to show that the left-hand side of the previous equation is strictly increasing in Θ ∈ (0, ∞) for (Θ) ∈ ( ,̄). Only for a very specific value of the entry cost, , we have that (Θ ) = . In this case, entry is efficient. However, entry is inefficiently low whenever > ⇒ Θ > Θ and (Θ) > , or excessively high when < ⇒ Θ < Θ and (Θ) < . When sellers face low entry costs, the equilibrium prescribes larger surpluses for buyers. In contrast, for very large entry costs, sellers are able to extract almost all of the surplus of the match. A low entry cost facilitates entry and tilts the bargaining power afforded by the market (via Θ) towards buyers. The reverse is observed when sellers face large entry costs.
D Proof of Lemma 2
Definēsuch that (̄) =̄′(̄), i.e., (̄) = 0, and̄= ′ (̄). We summarize the buyer's optimal ex-post choice as follows:
In a competitive search equilibrium with Θ ∈ (0, ∞) , the positive measure of deviating sellers can choose a price that is either in [, ∞) and the constraint is not binding, or in (0,) under binding constraint. Define the first possible deviation as 1 = ′ (̃1) and the second possible deviation as 2 = (̃2) /̃2. It is easy to show that the buyers' expected payoffs are
while for sellers we have
It is clear that 2 = 0 holds when sellers receive no surplus. Thus no sellers would deviate and offer 2 and̃2 in a submarket. Sellers fully anticipate that the best ex-post choice of buyers is to fully extract all of their surplus. It must be then that the competitive search equilibrium price is ∈ [, ∞). The optimal ex-post choice is then
. In other words, sellers anticipate that̃1( 1 ) is the equilibrium buyers' best response.
E Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is very similar to the one of Proposition 1. First, to show existence, we use again the fact that
where under
find (omitting as an argument) the following
Thus, under these sufficient conditions we have that ( ) is downward concave. For buyers,
Hence, under these sufficient conditions we have that ( ) is upward convex. We also have that ( ) = 0 and (̄) = 1, with ( ) > 0, ∀ ∈ ( ,̄). Again, since (Θ) ∈ (0, 1), ∀Θ ∈ (0, ∞), there exists a ∈ ( ,̄) satisfying eq. (18).
To prove uniqueness, we need ′ ( ) > 0, ∀ ∈ ( ,̄). Using eq. (18) and the properties of ( ) and ( ), we can derive the following sufficient condition
where ( ) = ′ ( ) / ( ) > 1, due to the convexity of ( ). Note that if ′′′ is negative while preserving the properties of ( ) and ( ) as above, or ′′′ ≥ 0 but not too positive, this condition holds and we have ′ ( ) > 0, ∀ ∈( ,̄). Then, there exists a unique equilibrium ∈ ( ,̄), ∀Θ ∈ (0, ∞).
Notice that we cannot have an equilibrium with ∈ (0, ). Since ′ ( ) = ′ ( ) − ′ ( ) + ′′ ( ) = 0, we have ′ ( ) > ′ ( ) and < where ′ ( ) = ′ ( ), and ′ ( ) > 0 over this interval. In any competitive search equilibrium, if ∈ (0, ), a positive measure of buyers can increase , and increase sellers' surplus ( ) while buyers' surplus ( ) also increases. On the other hand, for any competitive search equilibrium with ∈ (̄,̂], where (̂) = (̂), ( ) < 0 over this interval and ( ) = 0, since sellers will not produce for negative surplus. A positive measure of sellers can deviate and post 1 =− , attracting a positive measure of buyers by offering them ( 1 ) > 0, and get positive surplus ( 1 ) > 0. Hence, we cannot have ∈ (̄,̂] in any competitive search equilibrium.
We are left to show that for any Θ ∈ (0, ∞), neither nor̄is an equilibrium. Consider the Lagrangian of the competitive search problem: Therefore, neither nor̄is an equilibrium when = Θ ∈ (0, ∞). Finally, by assumption we have ′ (Θ) < 0. From eq. (18)
Therefore, any increase in Θ leads to lower and higher over( ,̄).
18 Note that our results of sellers choosing quantities ex-post apply no matter who is posting. In Julien, Kennes, and King (2000) , workers (sellers) are posting and choosing their hours ex-post. Otherwise, one can have firms selling jobs and posting as in Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) , and choosing hours ex-post. 19 This environment has even more applications than the one highlighted in the previous subsection. The labor market example with hours of work in the previous section also fits this environment. In this context, one can envision workers (sellers) posting wages ex-ante and firms (buyers) choosing hours ℎ ex-post or firms (sellers) posting wages ex-ante and workers (buyers) choosing hours ex-post. Essentially, any environment in which prices are posted and quantities are chosen by buyers and produced on demand is a good fit (recent market trends where prices are known by consumers but quantities or quality are made on order, e.g. Dell Inc. in retail and many wholesale markets). 20 Note that here ( ) = − ′ ( ) / ( ) > 0 because when = ′ ( ), ′ ( ) > 0, unlike the case of = ′ ( ) and ′ ( ) < 0. 21 It is assumed that buyers are only able to visit a single firm. 22 This limited capacity assumption was made in the spirit of the Edgeworth's model. 23 If all firms are pricing at the average cost of producing their capacity, any single firm might be able to increase its profits by raising the price. However, if price is raised to > ( )/ so that ( , ) <̄, the probability of which any buyer would visit the firm falls to zero, as would the firm's profits. 24 The problem becomes max 
